

# Remediation Test of VPN Generator's Application & Cryptography Architecture

### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

#### **Engagement Details**

Client	VPN Generator	
Engagement Scope	Application & Cryptography Architecture Review	
Original Assessment Schedule Jul 11, 2023 - Jul 28, 2023		
Remediation Test Dates	Mar 6, 2024 - Mar 7, 2024	

#### **Remediation Test Update: Technical Findings Summary**

The information below summarizes the observations of the Includesec team during the course of the remediation test intended to reproduce the findings as originally reported. The team attempted to bypass any added mitigations or protections put in place to hinder exploitation of the findings.

Finding	Risk Rating	Status
L1	Low	Closed
L2	Low	Risk Accepted
L3	Low	Closed
L4	Low	Closed



#### **LOW-RISK FINDINGS**

#### **L1: Secret Stored in Source Code Repository**

Status: Closed

Notes:

This finding was retested and found to be remediated. The code base no longer contained any secrets stored in cleartext. The file identified in the original finding had been entirely removed from the folder, as can be seen from the output below, taken from the cloned repository.

```
$ pwd
[..]/ministry/conf
$ 1s -hal
total 8.0K
drwxr-xr-x 2 user user 4.0K Feb 6 19:53 ./
drwxr-xr-x 9 user user 4.0K Feb 6 19:53 ../
-rw-r--r- 1 user user 0 Feb 6 19:53 keep-me
```

No other credentials were found elsewhere.

## **L2: Strict Host Key Checking Disabled**

**Status:** Risk Accepted

Notes:

The VPN Generator team has accepted the risk for this finding with the following note:

This situation is not considered critical as it pertains solely to our internal network infrastructure. All API interactions are securely managed through password authentication. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the necessity for enhancements in our security protocols. As we anticipate transitioning to a REST API in the near future, we plan to adopt an alternative system for identification. This system will either be based on x509 certificates or another simplified method, ensuring a more robust security framework.

#### L3: Telegram Chat IDs Stored in Database

Status: Closed

Notes:

This finding was retested and found to be remediated. The **sessionID()** function now implemented an HMAC construction as per the recommendation in the original finding. The code snippet of the updated function can be seen below.

```
func sessionID(secret []byte, chatID int64) []byte {
   var int64bytes [8 + len(sessionSalt)]byte

   binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(int64bytes[:8], uint64(chatID))
   copy(int64bytes[8:], sessionSalt)

   mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, secret)
   mac.Write(int64bytes[:])

   id := append([]byte(sessionPrefix), mac.Sum(nil)...)
   return id
```



# **L4: Hosts Did Not Perform Automatic Updates**

Status: Closed

Notes:

This finding was retested and found to be remediated. The **unattended-upgrades** package had now been installed and enabled as per the recommendation. The following screenshot demonstrates the configuration that was observed on all the relevant hosts.

```
Last login: Mon Feb 19 12:41:14 2024 from 10.20.128.2

ubuntu@preprod-2-vm-ct-160:~$ sudo -i

root@preprod-2-vm-ct-160:~$ ps ax | fgrep unatt

758 ? Ssl 0:00 /usr/bin/python3 /usr/share/unattended-upgrades/unattended-upgrade-shutdown --wait-for-signal

3562517 pts/1 S+ 0:00 grep -F --color=auto unatt

root@preprod-2-vm-ct-160:~# dpkg -l | fgrep unatt

ii unattended-upgrades 2.8ubuntu1 all automatic installation of security upgrades
```

Note that the **VPN Generator** team stated that automating the reboot process was not desirable behavior for their circumstances; however, the assessment team believes the changes made are still sufficient to remediate this finding.